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Abstract
The UK Road Fund was set up in 1921 and financed by earmarked taxes, but was unsuccessful as a
form of road finance and abandoned in 1937. The paper examines why earmarking failed and what
problems arise for replacing road taxes by hypothecated road charges. These charges would need to
be regulated and could evolve into a more efficient system of road pricing. The paper claims that
recent experiences with regulating capital-intensive network industries make road user charging
and the commercialisation of the public highway both feasible and desirable, but that recent
government proposals for local earmarked taxes are inadequate.
JEL classification: H54, H11, R41, R48.
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments in most industrial countries are wrestling with the problem of how
to create an efficient and sustainable transport policy at minimal public expense.
Britain has devoted considerable political capital to the Great Transport Debate,
which the present Labour Government took up from its predecessor before
publishing its White Paper, A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone
(DETR, 1998b). This belatedly recognises that economic instruments, including
road pricing, might help ration more efficiently the increasingly scarce road
space available. Unfortunately, there is little discussion of the problem of
providing and financing an adequate level of infrastructure, and what little there
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is suggests fudge rather than rational policymaking. Until recently, the Treasury
targeted road taxes as virtually the single instrument to meet our greenhouse gas
commitments under the Kyoto Agreement, now that coal use in electricity
generation has been protected by the gas moratorium and consumers continue to
be subsidised by 12½ per cent on their domestic fuel use.
1 The 1999 Budget
proposed a climate change levy whose amount, at £1.7 billion, is about the same
as the increase in motor fuel duties under the automatic escalator that now raises
fuel duty by 6 percentage points above the rate of inflation annually (i.e. RPI +
6%). This climate change levy will fall on fuels not currently taxed by
hydrocarbon excises (gas, electricity and coal), but will only fall on industry, so
domestic fuel use will continue to be subsidised, and it is not levied on carbon,
as would seem logical for a climate change levy.
More recently, the government has published Breaking the Logjam (DETR,
1999), which suggests a way of improving the structure of charges facing
motorists and, for the first time in over 60 years, hypothecating or earmarking
the resulting revenues for local transport investments. This, and other initiatives
discussed in this paper, suggest that the government is attempting to grapple with
the economics of efficient road transport provision. To date, though, these
attempts have lacked a clear framework for successful implementation, and
instead reflect the almost irreconcilable tensions between the Treasury and the
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR).
The aim of this paper is to show that restructuring the present set of road
charges and earmarking part of it to expenditure on highways could lead to a
more efficient road charging system. It would improve road finances, clarify the
role of environmental, or ‘green’, taxes and allow for a gradual shift to more
efficient road pricing as technology improves in a way that would command
support rather than arousing suspicion and opposition. It would also draw on the
experience of regulating capital-intensive network infrastructure that has been
one of Britain’s more useful contributions to recent economic policymaking. The
larger part of this paper is devoted to the attractions and problems of tax
earmarking, as that is central to the proposals, reflecting the current tensions
between Treasury hostility to the notion of hypothecation and the DETR’s quest
for additional sources of transport finance.
II. EARMARKING AND USER CHARGES
Tax earmarking is the allocation of certain tax revenues to a designated end use,
and the US federal gasoline tax, which is allocated to the Highways Trust Fund,
is an excellent example, though social security, paid into the Social Security
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Trust Fund, is quantitatively far more important in the US (by a factor of 20).
User charges for publicly supplied services are charges levied on users of the
service whose revenue helps defray the cost of providing the service. The
distinction between the two in practice is semantic. In the US, taxes require the
passage of a law but user fees do not, and the US Supreme Court (Skinner vs.
Mid-America 87-2098) argued that Congress has the responsibility of defining
the difference between user fees and taxes, and hence deciding whether a new
law is required. Earmarked taxes are not identified as such in the US budget, but
by the characteristic that their revenues are placed in a Trust Fund which can
only spend on designated activities (such as highway improvement and
maintenance).
User charges are price-like instruments which emerge naturally in financing a
service whose use can be restricted to paying consumers (as for entering national
parks). In many cases, it may be costly or impractical to charge directly for the
service and relatively easy to levy a charge on some commodity needed to enjoy
the service — so a road user charge is most readily collected by an annual
licence fee on motor vehicles (for access to the highway) and a charge (or tax)
on road fuel (gasoline and diesel), whose use correlates well with the
consumption of the services provided by the highway.
The British Treasury has always firmly resisted hypothecating or earmarking
taxes to particular purposes, but again finds difficulty with the borderline
between taxes and earmarked sources of revenue. In practice, politicians decide
what label to give each new impost, much as in the US.
2 One rather contentious
example was Mrs Thatcher’s community charge — in common parlance, the poll
tax — to finance local government services. The fossil fuel levy is a nice
example of a tax-like instrument whose proceeds are paid into a sinking fund to
meet the cost of future nuclear liabilities, but which the government claimed was
not a tax.
3 The recent windfall tax, levied on the ‘excess’ profits of privatised
utilities, is also earmarked, as are non-domestic rates (i.e. property taxes), which
are hypothecated to finance local authority spending. Remaining taxes are paid
into the Consolidated Fund where they are freely available to be allocated to
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those activities that the government votes. The System of National Accounts
1993 definition captures the distinctive characteristics of taxes well:
7.48   Taxes are compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in kind,
made by institutional units to government units. They are described as
unrequited because the government provides nothing in return to the
individual unit making the payment, although governments may use the
funds raised in taxes to provide goods or services to other units, either
individually or collectively, or to the community as a whole.
On this interpretation, the fossil fuel levy clearly is a tax, as those paying do not
receive any benefits, which go instead to those who are exempt from the tax
(nuclear generators). The Treasury’s view is that hypothecation of revenues
should be limited to a few specific instances for which there is a very good case.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRITISH ROAD FINANCE
Jeffreys (1949) observes that landowners across whose land roads passed had
long tried to place their cost of upkeep on others — first their tenants, then by
setting up turnpikes to collect dues from travellers and, when that failed through
high costs and the bankruptcy of most of the trusts, by placing the burden on the
parishes, which in turn collected rates that fell once more on landowners. The
very unequal burden on different parishes was alleviated by revenue sharing
under the Highway Act of 1862, and then supplemented by state grants from
1882. A proposal for a van and wheel tax in 1888 was so unpopular that it was
withdrawn but the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act of 1909
proposed to ‘provide the country with a new system of highways suitable for
motor traffic, and relieve the ratepayers of the cost of making and maintaining
those highways by placing it entirely upon the motoring community’. The Road
Board, however, chose not to spend any revenue on new roads and instead
distributed most of the Road Improvement Fund to highway authorities as grants














































































































































to greater clarity in the Estimates and more information being available to
Members if the Road Fund were abolished, and expenditure on roads provided for
in a normal departmental Vote’. Although the Road Fund was officially abolished
in 1955, it was effectively terminated in 1937, when hypothecation of motor
vehicle licence duties was ended. Between 1937 and 1955, the Road Fund had
no revenues of its own and became merely an administrator of the grant in aid.
Part of the difficulty in devising a coherent system of highway finance was
that the highway system had already been developed for non-motorised traffic,
providing access to adjoining property which increased its value. Naturally,
property owners were the logical target for financing highways. The original idea
of taxing motorised traffic was that new and better-quality roads would be
needed and would primarily benefit motor vehicles, which should therefore pay
for this additional expenditure.
What lessons can we draw from this history? First, note that the Road Fund
did not receive all the taxes levied on road users, only those elements that looked
like charges or fees, such as motor licences. Fuel excises or duties were too
clearly tax-like and hence allocated to the Consolidated Fund. Second, quite
reasonably at first, the idea was that the revenues were to be used for additional
expenditures required for motorised traffic (though that was not how they were
used in practice). Third, and this survived until 1995, the accounts that continued
to be presented to Parliament were cash flow and not proper resource accounts,
which only identified ‘the amount spent by national and local governments on
building, maintaining and policing the roads network, together with expenditure
on roads administration, research and road publicity’ (Department of Transport,
1995). Proper resource accounts would include the interest on the value of the
capital tied up in roads, and depreciation (which, in steady state, might be
adequately proxied by maintenance expenditure), and would treat investment in
new facilities as a capital, not a current, item. Consequently, the accounts were
ill suited to the proper management of and charging for a capital-intensive
activity in need of considerable early investment.
Finally, the problem with the major road investment programme that Britain
clearly needed was that it would require large borrowing in the early stages to
build up a capital stock. This would generate revenues to pay off the loans —Fiscal Studies
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initial deficits would be matched by subsequent surpluses. It seems reasonably
easy to finance activities with earmarked taxes where there is a fairly constant
and predictable stream of expenditure closely related to the services supplied.
Revenues can be matched to expenditures without major fluctuations from year
to year, and hence without requiring detailed government scrutiny of the reasons
for changing taxes. The model of hypothecated revenue where income and
expenditure are in close balance thus fails for roads, at least in the early
transitional stage.
Of course, the whole purpose of setting up a Fund is that it does allow some
smoothing of revenues and expenditures, but the scale of the required imbalances
would clearly make the government uncomfortable (see Figure 1 below), and it
decided it was easier to transfer the monitoring and executive functions to the
Department of Transport, which would then bid for resources in the annual
funding round like any other department. This early experiment of earmarking
was thus doomed to failure. The main relic was the annual presentation to
Parliament of The Allocation of Road Track Costs, based on a methodology
finally stabilised in 1968, which demonstrated the extent to which the
Department of Transport had satisfied government policy ‘that road users should
pay at least enough in motoring taxation (fuel duty and Vehicle Excise Duty) to
cover the total expenditure on roads’ (Department of Transport, 1995).
IV. FROM PUBLIC TO REGULATED PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
NETWORK UTILITIES
Neither Britain nor the US appeared to have much difficulty in financing the
substantial expansion of their highway systems after the Second World War,
though Britain, under tight Treasury financing limits, was always more niggardly
in its design standards and slow to embrace the case for high-quality interurban
motorway networks, in contrast to continental Europe. Figure 1 shows, for
selected pre-war years and annually after 1953, both the revenue from road users
(mostly motor fuel excises and vehicle excise duties, but excluding VAT) and
total road expenditures, which are broken down into capital and current (mainly
maintenance) expenditure after 1953.
4 The share of current expenditure in GDP
was roughly constant, but investment rose rapidly as Britain belatedly (and
relatively slowly) attempted to build a modern motorway system.
This post-war increase in investment was mirrored in the rest of the public
sector, which was now committed to the public finance of all infrastructure, most
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often reallocate the total between categories. This is likely to be a special problem in earlier years, before the
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FIGURE 1
Road Revenue and Expenditure as Shares of GDP, Great Britain
Note: Revenue excludes VAT.
Sources: Transport Statistics Great Britain, various years; 1998 and 1999 Budgets (Stationery Office, 1998
and 1999).
of which was managed by public corporations (electricity, gas, water, rail) or
within the public sector (post and telecommunications, roads). During the
‘Golden Age’ of West European growth (1950–73), public investment rose as a
share of GDP (Figure 2) and the public sector balance sheet improved as it
accumulated assets faster than public debt (helped by rising inflation which
depressed public sector real interest rates and eroded the real value of the
































































Net Public Sector Capital Formation as a Share of GDP
Source: Blue Book 1996.
stagnated for a decade, unemployment rose and, with it, public expenditure on
unemployment insurance. Profits fell, eroding taxes, while social expenditure
continued to grow with an ageing and politically more demanding electorate. In
an attempt to rein in public expenditure and bear down on inflation, the
government held down the prices of public utilities, causing them cash-flow
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(which had excess capacity and stagnant demand), it was increasingly urgently
needed in telecoms, and less evidently in water. Figures 1 and 2 show the
collapse in public investment taking place shortly after the IMF visited the UK in
1976.
The resolution of the investment problem was discovered almost by accident
by privatising British Telecom in 1984, transferring investment outside the
public sector borrowing requirement, and cashing in some of the public sector
net assets in exchange for share sales proceeds. BT’s new-found ability to adjust
its prices for inflation and the protection from political intervention afforded by
its licence meant that investment could be readily financed by commercial
borrowing, though in the event the rapid fall in costs and healthy profits meant
that investment was mainly financed from retained profits. British Gas was
privatised in 1986 as a highly profitable monopoly, though at a substantial
discount to its asset value. The water companies followed in 1989, but here the
past underinvestment in the public sector and new environmental standards set
by the European Commission meant that investment would exceed current
profits. Prices were set to rise in real terms, and the protection of licences and
regulatory oversight here were critical in enabling the companies to finance the
large rise in investment.
The electricity supply industry was sold in 1990, and here the government
gave up a flow of net transfers to the Treasury, which was effectively capitalised
in the share price. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) showed that, under plausible
counterfactual assumptions, the public sector income was unprofitably
exchanged for short-term privatisation receipts.
Finally, and most relevant for our present purpose, British Rail was radically
restructured into a large number of different companies, and sold off in 1996.
The core network utility of the track, signals, tunnels and bridges was kept intact
in the monopoly, Railtrack, which was sold, as were the earlier network utilities,
to large numbers of domestic shareholders (and others such as pension funds).
Railtrack’s revenue streams were protected by seven-year (or longer) contracts
with train-operating companies (TOCs) which paid largely fixed charges for
track access (covering 91 per cent of total revenue), with the remaining 9 per
cent as very low variable charges for use (to cover direct wear and tear and
electric power for traction). The TOCs in turn bid for the franchises by
specifying the level of government subsidy they would need each year to finance
the agreed level of services, in some cases falling to negative levels in later years
(i.e. payments to the government for the right to earn profits on the protected
franchise). Leasing companies in turn leased rolling stock to the TOCs for the
duration of the franchise and were responsible for (but remarkably inactive in)
investing in new rolling stock. In effect, the government was willing to commit a
stream of public revenues to the TOCs for seven years or more in order to
transfer the management of the railways to the private sector and, with it, accessFiscal Studies
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to further funds that would no longer be constrained by limits on public sector
borrowing.
The comparative advantage of public ownership is the ability to finance
capital-intensive networks and natural monopolies, both from its tax base and
from its monopoly ownership. This claim may seem curious, given the argument
that investment could only be adequately supported by privatisation, but is amply
demonstrated before 1973. So long as the government had confidence in the
integrity of public sector management and attached sufficient priority to
investment over consumption, the system was able to deliver high rates of
investment. It was put under stress when the government attempted to reduce
inefficiency and increase real rates of return as the fiscal situation deteriorated
during the 1970s. The problem was that the industries were able to finance
current operations out of current revenues, so that the main impact of tightening
cash limits fell on the investment programme. The problem of public sector
management was one of finding a way of rewarding efficient investment in an
environment of annual renegotiations over the budget. Efficiency that lowered
costs would lead the Treasury to require repayments (negative external financial
limits), with no benefit to the industry, while inefficiency and high costs forced
the Treasury to underwrite costs, as the industries supplied essential services.
The only sanction available was to cut budgets and hence investment, with
consequent deteriorations in quality.
Privatisation forced the government to devise better methods of regulating
and financing these natural monopoly industries. The solution was to grant
licences embodying price-cap regulation, reset at periodic reviews every four to
five years. What are the advantages and limitations of the UK regulatory model
for network utilities? First, it allows regulation to be concentrated on the core
natural monopoly component and permits the potentially competitive elements to
be exposed to the incentive and discovery effects of the competitive market.
Second, setting a price cap for a specified period — typically four to five years
— provides incentives to cut costs and earn additional profits for shareholders
while periodically allowing the price cap to be reset, transferring benefits to
consumers. When it works well, this mechanism mimics the effect of the
competitive market where innovation allows the innovator to reap temporarily
supernormal profits until entry or competitive emulation drives the price back
towards cost. Third, the licence protects the rights of the utility while the
privatisation Acts specify the duties of the regulator (which always include
enabling the utility to be able to finance its activities). Reasonably well-defined
dispute resolution procedures involving the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission sustain this regulatory commitment. This enables greater clarity of
purpose and reduces the inefficient bargaining over rents that characterises
interest-group politics under state ownership. Finally, the duty the regulator has
to protect consumers means that he or she is required to monitor costs and
investment to that end, and his or her success can be measured by the publishedRoad Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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accounts and share prices of the utility, in contrast to the obscure workings of
departmental controls over the nationalised industries.
The drawbacks are that the efficiency gains may not be passed back to
consumers or the government, but to shareholders, whose required rate of return
is considerably higher than the cost of public sector borrowing. Cross-subsidies,
which previously protected vulnerable consumers, will be eliminated by cost-
based pricing unless specifically protected. In the case of the railways, it is not
yet clear whether the co-ordination benefits of an integrated network can be
achieved under very fragmented ownership. Finally, the government no longer
feels responsible for protecting consumer interests against excessively costly
European environmental legislation.
However, one lesson that does emerge is that regulatory accounting for
capital-intensive network utilities has improved and is able to sustain appropriate
levels of investment (low in electricity, high in water) without requiring annual
adjustments to the regulated prices. Price-cap regulation devolves more
responsibility for adjusting individual prices towards costs to those most
knowledgeable and provides better incentives for efficient management of
investment projects. In all these respects, the experience is of considerable
improvement compared with the former public sector management of
investment.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR FUNDING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN ROADS
The optimistic view is that the past decade has provided a wealth of new
experience about the management of network industries under private regulated
ownership, of which the most relevant for a new system of management and
finance for roads are Railtrack and the water companies. It is far from obvious
that the road system needs to be privatised to address problems of
underinvestment, and the model of a regulated public corporation with clear
contractual quality standards may offer a desirable alternative model. New
Zealand has pioneered such corporations, sometimes as a step towards
privatisation, while state industries in France have long enjoyed greater
commercial freedom than their counterparts in Britain. Electricité de France is
not even a corporation (though it does pay taxes on profits), yet it is free to
borrow abroad to finance the acquisition of foreign electricity companies (such
as London Electricity) when they are privatised, or to build power-stations and
transmission systems.
5 Indeed, the most enthusiastic buyers of trade sales of
privatised utilities seem to be continental state-owned public utilities.
The question to address is whether Britain can evolve a satisfactory
institutional framework for managing a publicly owned highway system, and
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whether this would be an improvement on the present arrangement, which has
been the subject of a continuous transport debate for many years under the
previous and present governments. The case for change is that it is inefficient to
manage investment projects, most of which last many years, under a system of
unpredictable annual budgets, that transport policy lacks direction, that present
forms of finance hinder improvements in the efficiency of road charging and that
consumers lack confidence in the ability of the government to meet their
transport needs at reasonable cost (see, for example, Newbery (1995) and
Institution of Civil Engineers (1997)).
The three key institutional changes required to address these problems would
be:
•  the creation of an agency or corporation (which, for convenience, we shall
call Roadtrack, the counterpart to Railtrack) entrusted with the highway
assets and responsible for their management;
•  a regulatory agency to oversee its activities, which we shall call OfRoad, the
counterpart of ORR (the Office of Rail Regulation); and
•  the replacement of some part of current road taxes by road user charges under
the (regulated) control of Roadtrack, outside the present system of Treasury
control.
Roadtrack would need to set road user charges to produce a predictable, stable
and adequate revenue stream to finance current expenditure and underwrite the
ability to borrow on capital markets at home and abroad where necessary. In
practice, sensible levels of road user charges would produce a substantial surplus
for payment as interest or dividends to the Treasury (representing the public
owner) which might prove adequate to finance investment, though the Treasury
may wish additions to capital stock to be financed by borrowing, to ensure that
its dividend stream was predictable. OfRoad would be required to ensure that
Roadtrack does not abuse its monopoly position, to monitor the quality of
service provided and to reset the price or revenue cap periodically after
determining the level required for efficient operation of the highway system.
Road taxes, exclusive of VAT receipts, collected £23.9 billion in 1997–98, or
nearly 10 per cent of total tax revenue. Figure 1 shows that the road taxes have,
for almost their entire history, been considerably higher than road expenditures
and that, recently, the margin between the two has widened as the tax share has
risen and the road expenditure share fallen, despite a steady increase in traffic
and hence demand. The source of this information — The Allocation of Road
Track Costs — is no longer presented annually to Parliament, not because it
shows an apparently embarrassing overtaxation of road vehicles, but because the
government claims that the principles of cost allocation used in the document are
flawed. In 1995–96, when road taxes collected £19 billion, the costs allocated
included £3.2 billion of investment expenditure, together with about £4 billion ofRoad Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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maintenance expenditure, but excluded any interest on or depreciation of the
road network, which might be somewhere in the range £6–11 billion. Since
1995–96, when this information was last produced, road taxes have risen 24 per
cent in real terms (estimate for 1998–99), while maintenance expenditure does
not appear to have risen and investment expenditure has fallen (DETR, 1998a).
The government proposes to move to a resource-based system of accounting,
in which assets are properly identified and charged for. As the government states
in its Green Paper, Paying for Better Motorways (HMSO, 1993),
The track cost system, which was originally set up in 1968, takes account
only of the cash costs of capital expenditure on road construction and of
current expenditure on road maintenance. Track costs do not therefore
include, for example, a return on the capital investment represented in the
road network, as would be the case under normal charging methods, nor
can they reflect congestion costs. And they do not take account of the
wider costs that road use imposes, such as environmental effects, though
there is, at present, no generally agreed basis for putting monetary values
on these.
In the government’s consultation document, Developing an Integrated Transport
Policy, issued on 20 August 1997, it invited responses to 27 issues, among which
was the question ‘How can we ensure, for example through the taxation system,
that the prices faced by transport users more accurately reflect the wider
environmental and social costs?’. The government therefore appears to be open
to a more rational system of determining road taxes or charges. The new system
ought to be transparent and consist of three elements. The first would be a set of
road user charges based on a careful assessment of the relevant costs to be
charged out. The second would be a set of green taxes on environmental impacts
such as pollution, CO2 emissions etc. If the government considers that polluters
should pay taxes to internalise external costs, then this principle would logically
apply to all sources of such pollutants, perhaps differentiated if the damage done
varies with source. The third, economically less defensible but probably
politically essential, element would be a pure revenue-raising tax on road
transport, set to collect the shortfall between the road charges and environmental
taxes and the current level of road taxes. It should be collected as an additional
VAT at an appropriate rate or, less appropriately, as an additional pure revenue-
raising excise tax on fuel and/or vehicles.
The case for this three-part division is made below, but it is useful to see how
large each part might be on the basis of admittedly rather sketchy estimates of
the environmental externalities. Table 1 presents the accounts of highways and
Railtrack on a comparable basis, where it is assumed that the operating costs,
which are largely maintenance for roads, are sufficient to maintain the networkFiscal Studies
116
at a constant standard (so that it does not effectively require any depreciation).
6
Present levels of expenditure are probably below those needed to arrest any
deterioration in road quality, so the figures may understate the required
infrastructural renewals charge.
7 Setting green taxes to internalise externalities is
not straightforward, and is considered first, as it bears on the logic of separating
out road user charges.
VI. ISSUES IN PRICING ROAD USE
As stated above, our proposed charging system would consist of three
components: road user charges, environmental taxes and a pure tax. While the
pure tax element is, inevitably, distortive, environmental taxes are intended to
correct for undercharging for environmental externalities and confront road users
with the social costs of transport. Road user charges would charge for the
provision of transport infrastructure, just as charges for other public utilities
                                                                                                                                   
6When the government introduces resource accounting, it will have to decide how to treat depreciation, and the
natural model to follow is that of infrastructural renewals charge (IRC) as practised by the water and sewerage
companies. This would consider the road network as a single system to be maintained in perpetuity. The IRC
would be the maintenance and major repair expenditures, averaged over several years, sufficient to maintain the
system with no loss of value.
7DETR (1998a, p. 83) gives a time series of an index of defects, with a base of 1977=100. Five out of nine of
the categories of roads have defects in 1997 higher than in 1977, and the traffic-weighted average value is 107,
currently rising and the highest level yet achieved, suggesting that current maintenance levels are somewhat
below the IRC requirement. More important, capital expenditures include reconstruction and resurfacing, as
well as bridge repairs, which should be included in the IRC figures.
TABLE 1




Capital value 120,000 6,905
Interest on capital (at 6 per cent) 7,200 414
Operating costs 3,900 2,090
Taxes or revenue 18,900 2,300
Surplus excluding externalities 7,800 –204
Externalities:
Air pollution + CO2 3,300 75
Noise 1,300 ?
Total identified externalities 4,600 75
Surplus after externalities 3,200 –279
aCurrent cost accounting values.
Source: Department of Transport, 1995, Appendix Table A1.Road Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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reflect the costs of their provision. There are several issues, however, that
deserve some discussion.
1. Implications of Paying for Environmental Damage
The idea that road users (and others) should pay for environmental damage has
far-reaching implications. To an economist, the obvious way in which road users
should pay is through the tax system, as the environment is held in trust for all
— there is no obvious owner to whom payments should be made other than the
state acting as custodian. Taxes are not the only way and, indeed, the idea of
levying environmental (or green) taxes is a fairly novel concept in Britain. The
normal way in which polluters have, in the past, paid for pollution is by being
forced to undertake otherwise unattractive expenditures to meet mandated
standards of quality. The most obvious example in transport is the vehicle
emission standards that are set by the government for new vehicles, but there are
a host of regulations about noise levels, safety standards (alcohol levels, vehicle
lights, seat belts, road worthiness etc.) designed to control the impact vehicles
have on the environment and other road users (some literally). However, using
green taxes, in addition to various standards, has a number of economic
advantages and political attractions.
The political attractions of green taxes are obvious — they are likely to
command more support than other kinds of taxes, as they cloak the painful
process of extracting revenue in a mantle of virtue and provide a salve for guilt.
The main economic advantage of taxes that reflect the marginal damage is that
they leave the user to decide how best to respond, rather than forcing him or her
to make one particular kind of decision. They are also more accurately targeted
to the damage caused and therefore likely to be more effective at lower cost.
Perhaps the best-known example is the higher tax on leaded than on unleaded
petrol, which raised the proportion of motorists buying unleaded petrol from 5
per cent in 1988 to 63 per cent by 1993. Forcing all motorists to switch to
unleaded petrol would have required major premature scrapping of older
vehicles and would not have been politically acceptable. Just requiring new
vehicles to be able to run on unleaded petrol would have discouraged the
replacement of older vehicles, as the newer ones would require more expensive
engines. Nor would it have provided any incentive to actually buy unleaded
petrol.
If green taxes are to be both politically attractive and economically effective,
they must be clearly distinguished from other taxes or charges, set at levels
determined by acceptable methods of computing the cost of the damage done,
and applied uniformly to all sources of the same damage. That is, environmental
taxes should be distinct,  defensibly quantified and non-discriminatory. These
criteria pose the greatest challenge and will lead to the most radical
consequences for the tax treatment of transport.Fiscal Studies
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2. Distinct Environmental Taxes
The central idea of confronting road users with the full cost of their decisions is
that it will lead to a better use of all resources, especially those currently
unpriced, such as the environment. But this will only work well if all the other
resources are properly priced. Road users require road space, which is expensive
to provide and often heavily used by other road users. In a market economy,
consumers are familiar with the idea that they should pay to use scarce
resources, that the payment should be enough to provide the full cost of the
service supplied (capital and running costs) and that, where capacity is limited
and demand varies, peak users should pay more than off-peak users. This last
idea is that there is no need to expand capacity for off-peak users, and so only
peak users, who need the extra capacity, should pay for expansion and they
should pay the entire cost of the extra capacity. Thus electricity consumers with
large metered loads (including regional electricity companies buying for
domestic customers) pay a large amount determined by their demand on the three
peak half-hours of the year.
8
On this argument, road users should pay the costs of providing road space
and, particularly, they should pay for maintenance (more for the more damaging
heavy vehicles) and other operating costs, and interest on the capital of the road
network. Ideally, these charges should be higher on congested roads but, until the
arrival of a cost-effective and politically acceptable form of charging motorists
different amounts on different roads and at different times of the day, simpler
and cruder means of setting the charges will have to do. At present, road users
pay two kinds of charge or tax — the vehicle excise duty (VED) and fuel tax.
Government policy in the past has been that each class of road user should pay at
least enough to cover the total expenditure on roads (which is not the same as the
total cost of providing road space), and to that end VED can be finely adjusted
by type of vehicle to bring the total level of taxes for that kind of vehicle up to at
least the allocated level of road expenditure. To give an example, the VED on a
light goods vehicle with a gross vehicle weight (gvw) of 3.5–7.5 tonnes was
£150 per year in 1995–96, 6 per cent of the total tax paid by such vehicles, while
the VED on an articulated lorry of gvw between 33 and 38 tonnes was £5,000
per year, 29 per cent of the total tax paid by such vehicles, or 33.3 times as large
as the smaller lorry.
The total costs of supplying road space are equal to the capital and operating
costs, and while the latter are carefully measured, the public sector has been
remiss in keeping good capital accounts of the road network, so this part is less
readily available. Nevertheless, rough estimates can be made and are given in
Table 1. The DETR is currently endeavouring to prepare more accurate estimates
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revenue from capacity charges based on either peak demand or declared generation capacity, and relatively
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of the written-down replacement cost of the road system from careful
engineering studies of a sample of roads, and the Commission of the European
Communities has invited tenders for rough estimates, based on past levels of
investment in roads, for the member countries of the European Union, so better
estimates should soon be available.
A rough estimate of the capital value might be £120 billion.
9 If we take a cost
of capital of 6 per cent real (the public sector discount rate, and now higher than
the return of 5.25 per cent proposed for the water industry in Ofwat (1998)), the
interest cost would be £7,200 million, or rather more than twice the annual rate
of investment in roads. Adding on the running costs of the road system gives a
total of £11 billion at the 6 per cent interest rate, substantially below the road
taxes of nearly £19 billion shown in Table 1.
At the moment, the government does not identify that part of total road taxes
that is the cost of providing road space, and therefore cannot define that part that
might be environmental taxes or charges for other social costs, such as accidents
or noise. It has defended increases in fuel taxes in real terms as required to help
meet the Rio targets for CO2 emissions. Unless the government does set out the
basis on which road taxes are set, it will be impossible to identify the green tax
part, and road users will have no assurance that the total road tax level is set on
fair or defensible grounds. Claims that road taxes are being increased to reflect
the social costs of transport will carry no credibility and run the risk of bringing
the whole idea of green taxes into disrepute.
3. Other Problems with Setting Green Taxes on Transport
Newbery (1997b) argues that successive governments have been highly selective
in targeting the transport sector with environmental taxes, particularly carbon
taxes. Carbon taxes have been advocated as one of the simplest forms of green
taxation, for they can be imposed very precisely on the source of the problem —
the carbon content of the fuel, which is easily measured and completely defines
the damaging potential of the CO2. Such carbon taxes have been proposed by the
EU, but were soundly rejected by the Trade and Industry Committee of the
House of Commons, when it came to examine the market for coal, as being
likely to accelerate the decline of the British coal industry. Since then, the
Conservative Government was defeated in its attempt to raise VAT on domestic
energy from 8 per cent to the standard rate of 17½ per cent, while the Labour
Government actually reduced the rate to 5 per cent, thus effectively subsidising
domestic gas and electricity use by 12½ per cent. The fossil fuel levy, designed
to tax fossil fuel used in electricity generation and initially set at 10 per cent, has
                                                                                                                                   
9The estimated capital value in Table 1 is found by adding the gross value of the investment in roads each year
to the last figure for the capital value of the road system published (for the year 1981), assuming that the
expected lifetime of roads has remained unchanged, and revaluing using the cost index of all road construction.
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almost disappeared, though the proposed climate change levy looks set to replace
it at a higher level (but only to tax industrial energy use, and not on carbon
content). The tax increase of 3.6p/litre from March 1999 amounts to £56/tonne
of carbon, or well above $10/barrel of oil, which was the suggested total EU
carbon tax (and only half was to be on the carbon content of the fuel, the rest
being on the energy content).
10 In short, tax policy towards greenhouse gases is
in disarray.
4. Setting the Road User Charges
The ideal road user charge signals to the potential road user whether, when and
by what mode best to make a given trip, and also signals to Roadtrack, as the
supplier of road services (and to other modal operators, including Railtrack and
the TOCs), where to expand supply. OfRoad will be concerned to ensure not
only that Roadtrack responds to these and other signals in making cost-justified
investments to maintain the efficient level of quality, but also that it does this at
least cost. OfRoad also has a direct interest in ensuring that road user charges
reflect marginal social costs as well as possible, to give the clearest signals,
while making sure that the estimated costs are not inflated by inefficient
provision, just as Ofgas is discussing with TransCo how best to ensure that
charges for using the National Transmission System reflect the long-run
marginal costs of moving gas from gasfields to final consumers.
Initially, the road user charge would be levied on the same tax base as current
road taxes — namely, fuel and vehicle characteristics — until such time as
charging users directly for the costs they incur or the demands they make on
scarce road space becomes technically possible and economically justified (i.e.
the benefits of improved charging outweigh the extra costs of collection). The
advantage of this programme is that such a system of road pricing would be seen
as a replacement for and not an addition to the present set of road taxes, and a
majority of road users would benefit from the switch (as the majority of
congestion and road damage is done by a minority of vehicles). The overall level
of charges would be set in the same way as the levels of charges for the National
Grid, Transco and Railtrack are set — to earn a return on the asset base and to
cover forecast operating costs and depreciation. New investment would be
financed either out of retained income (i.e. the return on existing assets) or by
borrowing against the return to be allowed on the new assets, just as with those
networks.
Clearly identifying the costs and setting the charges for providing road
services would allow these services to be financed, while the creation of an
appropriate regulatory framework to monitor the quality and efficiency of supply
of road services should address the perennial problem of underinvestment in
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roads. One potential advantage of keeping Roadtrack in the public sector is that
there should be less tension between the demands of the shareholders to earn
profits by cutting investment and the demands of the road users, who see the
consequential decline in service quality. ORR is currently concerned that
Railtrack (and the rolling stock leasing companies) have been slow to resume
pre-privatisation investment levels, and that, as a result, service quality has been
falling, while Railtrack’s share price more than doubled in the first year after
privatisation. The downside is that investment in public corporations was not
least-cost, for the attractions of engineering ambitions were not counterbalanced
by stock market monitoring.
VII. PROBLEMS OF COMMERCIALISING THE ROAD NETWORK
Given all these obvious advantages, it is striking that no country has yet set up a
successful and efficient road fund and system of road charges that might reap
these advantages. What, then, are the difficulties in commercialising roads?
The first difficulty is related to the specification of the interest rate and the
valuation of the network, both apparently conceptually difficult tasks. Consider
what would be needed to commercialise the provision of road services in a
similar manner to the commercialisation of railway services. Roads are
expensive and durable, and the largest single item in the accounts would be
interest on the value of the network, at least if the assets were to be valued at
modern-equivalent-asset written-down value (as was the case in the past for
nationalised industries). At a very rough estimate (Newbery, 1988 and 1990), the
capital value of the road network is £100–150 billion, so at a 6 per cent real
interest rate, interest would be £6–9 billion per year, compared with direct
operating costs (largely maintenance) of nearly £4 billion, thus amounting to
about two-thirds of total costs. Compare the figures for Railtrack in Table 1,
where interest is less than one-sixth of total costs.
Valuing an existing road network that evolved from a pre-motor-vehicle age
is both conceptually and practically very difficult, though short-cut methods
exist (Newbery, 1988). The DETR has been instructed, under the new resource
accounting directive of the Treasury, to assess the feasibility of valuing the
capital stock of the road network, but it is making slow progress. The difficulty
should not be exaggerated. When other networks were privatised, the market
price was determined by the revenue that the regulator would allow the network
owner to earn, discounted at the market’s discount rate. Much the same approach
could be used for valuing the road infrastructure — the Treasury would
determine what would be an appropriate annual charge for the scarcity of road
space, as well as the real rate of interest, and the discounted value of that
revenue stream would determine the (indexed) market value of the debt
representing those assets.Fiscal Studies
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The real problems lie deeper. Even if the road network remains in the public
sector as a commercialised agency, accounting for interest and capital is
peculiarly difficult. The first problem is that, in Britain and most countries, the
public sector has a poor record of keeping good capital accounts and ensuring
that the book value of the assets keeps pace with movements in the price index of
modern equivalent assets. But techniques exist to do this and, in the decade or so
before privatisation, most nationalised industries used current cost accounting
methods for valuing their assets. Given that there is relatively little technical
progress in road building (unlike telecoms and power-stations, for example), the
problems of properly indexing the capital value of the road network are
relatively minor. A whole series of regulatory reviews to reset price caps, and an
attendant series of references to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, have
considerably clarified the issues involved in proper capital accounting (Newbery,
1997a).
There are, however, problems in the treatment of old and new capital that
have been revealed for the other network utilities and that will have to be
addressed before creating Roadtrack. The other network utilities, particularly
water and rail, face the problem that their inherited assets were valued by the
market at much less than their replacement cost. This means that the current
levels of charging (which are based on the market undervaluation of existing
assets) would not be enough to cover the costs of new investment. This probably
increases the reluctance of these privatised companies to invest, since their
marginal returns will be lower than their average returns, and requires the
regulators to agree a capital investment programme at each review, while
increasing the need to monitor performance standards to reduce incentives to
underinvest.
In the case of roads, the problem would only arise if the asset valuation
attributed to Roadtrack were substantially below the figure of £120 billion
suggested in Table 1 and/or if the required rate of return were less than 6 per
cent real. If road user charges were set to recover revenues on that base, as in
Table 1, then increasing road capacity in line with traffic to maintain constant
service levels (i.e. speeds) should be self-financing and the problem of marginal
investment costing more than the allowed revenue would be avoided. This claim
rests on a number of defences. At the theoretical level, Newbery (1989) showed
that, if there were constant marginal returns to increasing road capacity (for
which there appeared to be reasonable empirical support), then even where
weather accounts for a large fraction of road damage, setting road charges at
their efficient level (to ration road space and internalise congestion externalities
as well as charging for road damage) would generate exactly the same amount of
revenue as required to finance road operation and expansion. At the empirical
level, the benefit–cost ratio for accepted road projects using an 8 per cent
discount rate (i.e. higher than the proposed 6 per cent) appears to be well over
1.5, and there is little evidence of any systematic bias in ex ante traffic forecastsRoad Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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and realised traffic levels on which the appraisals were made. Finally, rough-
and-ready calculations presented in Newbery (1994) suggested that the marginal
cost of providing additional motorway capacity was about 2p/vehicle-kilometre,
whereas the average road tax revenue was more than twice that level (at 1993–94
prices and taxes; at current tax rates, the differential would be considerably
greater).
Of course, if the assets were written down or the required interest and
dividend payments on the asset base made to the Treasury were reduced (perhaps
because the Treasury wished to retain control over a larger fraction of road tax
revenue), then the charge element might not be sufficient to cover marginal
investment costs, and the same problems that occur with the other capital-
intensive networks might arise but in a more serious form. While the regulators
of the privatised network utilities are statutorily required to set price caps that
enable the utilities to finance their activities, there is no guarantee that a
regulated public sector utility would enjoy that assurance, and investment funds
may be inadequate.
Another serious problem is that the rate of interest at which the public sector
can borrow is the index gilt rate, which has typically been about 3 per cent real
but has now fallen to about 2 per cent real, which is substantially below the
required rate of return for public investment projects in roads (8 per cent real)
and also below the rate that regulators allowed network operators such as
National Grid to earn (7 per cent real).
11 One solution might be for the Treasury
to hold equity and insist, as the shareholder, that the weighted average cost of
capital is 6 per cent real, so that cheap borrowing would require a compensating
increase in the equity return. Unless the Treasury can devise a suitable
instrument, there would clearly be difficulties in decentralising the capital
budgeting decision, as a public utility with effective taxing powers would be able
to borrow at near the indexed gilt rate and would be tempted to select
investments yielding too low a rate of return if it were free to borrow at this rate.
If, instead, the Treasury were to continue to control investment decisions, then
nothing would have changed — roads would not have been corporatised.
In short, there is a fundamental problem of decentralising the finance of a
highly capital-intensive essential but public sector network service such as roads,
where the ability to raise revenue from users is potentially almost unbounded but
where the demand for new investment is relatively modest compared with the
return on the existing capital base. Similar problems arise in the private sector
where mature capital-intensive industries generate high cash flows that can be
used to liquidate debt, leverage mergers or invest in other sectors, often with less
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return, and it may follow that the right rate of return to set on roads is essentially the same as that on other
regulated networks and perhaps slightly below 6 per cent real.Fiscal Studies
124
than impressive financial returns to the owners. In short, private financial
oversight on such industries is not obviously superior, and private ownership
appears to work best when there is both intense competition and either a need for
new investment in the business (telecoms being the leading example) or an
opportunity for profitable investment elsewhere, so that there is a closer match
between profits generated and investment requirements. Ironically, these are the
circumstances in which old-style earmarking would probably also work quite
well.
Putting in place an adequate governance structure to set charges related to
costs which are directly available to finance investment might be difficult, and
the alternative, in which the Treasury sets taxes unrelated to costs and oversees
investment directly, appears to be administratively simpler (and allows higher
road taxes than might be feasible otherwise). In the past, European governments
have been more successful at sustaining adequate rates of infrastructural
investment from public funds than now seems to be the case, but it may be that
the balance of advantage has shifted back to corporatisation, particularly now
there is more experience of regulating such networks and ensuring politically
acceptable and economically justifiable revenue flows. Britain appears to be at a
favourable juncture in that cost-reflective road user charges, together with
sensible green taxes and modest levels of additional tax, might continue to
generate the same level of revenue as before, while its cumulative experience
with regulating other capital-intensive network utilities provides, for the first
time, a possible model. The central innovation in creating a Road Fund is that of
the regulator with appropriate powers to set charges and monitor service quality.
A further reason for thinking that the proposed solution would improve the
present system of road finance is that the British government is operating under
an inappropriate set of financial constraints on public sector investment projects
which have perverse effects and which require the kind of radical change in
approach suggested here. The government starts from the premiss that public
expenditure cannot be increased, but if private finance could be persuaded to
undertake the same investment projects, this constraint would be relaxed. In the
case of roads, the Private Finance Initiative originally proposed private
(unregulated) toll roads, but it was pointed out that this would lead to inefficient
diversion to untolled roads. The new approach represented by DFBO (design,
finance, build and operate) roads has moved to the more efficient system of
shadow rather than actual tolls, as they do not have the adverse effect of costly
collection points and undesirable traffic diversion. The model contract set out in
Highways Agency and Department of Transport (1995, Appendix E, 6.1)
requires that ‘Tenderers will bid for shadow tolls in respect of payment bands ...
in the form of pence per vehicle/kilometre ...’.
There would therefore seem to be a close similarity in purpose between tolls
designed to pay for specific roads and earmarked road charges designed to cover
total road expenditure. This similarity is even more apparent in the concept ofRoad Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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shadow tolls, where the road user perceives no increase in road charge but the
road supplier is recompensed for the fact that vehicles already pay for the use of
roads through road taxes. The net effect is that the government has effectively
borrowed at high rates of interest (because of the various political risks that the
contract will be renegotiated or its conditions changed by legislation) against the
future road budget, reducing the ability to finance later projects. Because the
finance is private, it does not appear in the budget as expenditure; nor do the
liabilities for future payments, which would under a proper system of accruals
accounting. In short, the government has accepted the principle of long-term
finance and earmarking road taxes for road investment for a part of its budget,
but at high cost and greater inflexibility and inefficiency for the remaining part.
There are other detailed design issues that are important but which do not
affect the thrust of the arguments advanced here. The most obvious have to do
with managing the interface between interurban roads, for which the corporate
model seems well suited, and urban roads under local jurisdiction (and possibly
minor rural roads, which have a universal service aspect). The Institution of Civil
Engineers (1996) proposes a three-tier structure of national, regional and local
roads, and the natural model here is the electricity supply industry, in which
National Grid plc owns and operates the national (high-voltage) system while
each of the 12 regional electricity companies owns and operates the regional and
local distribution systems. Regional corporations permit bench-mark regulation
of the kind so important in water and electricity regulation, while benefiting
from local expertise and accountability. Whether urban roads should remain
under local authority management with public external quality monitoring as at
present, or be absorbed into the regional corporations as local affiliates, is a
matter of detailed institutional design.
VIII. EVIDENCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
New Zealand issued Options for the Future: Land Transport Pricing Study (New
Zealand Ministry of Transport, 1997) inviting comments on a commercialised
model of road funding. The country has a National Roads Fund which receives
payments from road users. Roads in New Zealand are also funded by local
authority rates. The National Roads Fund receives payments from licence fees,
road user charges and part of the fuel tax. The maintenance and construction of
state highways are funded entirely by the National Roads Fund, while local roads
are funded approximately 50 per cent by territorial local authority rates and 50
per cent from the National Roads Fund. Although part of the motor vehicle
registration and fuel excise goes to the Crown Account and not to the Roads
Fund, part at least is earmarked and goes straight into the Roads Fund, providing
another contemporary example of hypothecated taxes for road expenditure as in
the US. The result is a hybrid system in which not all charges paid by road usersFiscal Studies
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are dedicated to roads and not all the road expenditures are funded from the
Roads Fund. The system is regarded as inconsistent and inadequate.
The two main problems identified in the report are the lack of a consistent set
of financial accounts and the lack of a long-term investment policy. Maintenance
and construction of roads rely on the National Roads Fund and the local
authority rates. Despite the continuous stream of money available for roads,
there are difficulties with funding new roads. Investment decisions are restricted
to short-term projects, with money spent in the same year that it is collected. No
revenues are put aside from current revenues to provide for known demands on
the system; nor are capital costs spread over time. Evidently, the Roads Fund is
not trusted to operate as a capital fund. There are various other problems with
the present system related to road charges (which are based on average, not
marginal, costs), cost allocation (presently done with a model that was last fully
reviewed in 1984), depreciation (apparently not properly accounted for) and
congestion (i.e. the failure to differentiate charges according to traffic
conditions). As in Britain, road users pay substantially more than is spent on
roads and contribute large funds to the Crown Account, mainly from fuel duty.
The target cut-off benefit–cost ratio for road investment is 4, which is incredibly
high, implying a need to increase investment, though it is forecast to increase to
7 by the year 2000 if nothing is changed.
12 Were this to be financed by raising
road charges, it would be at the expense of fuel excise currently going into the
Crown Account.
Five different options are currently under discussion, ranging from a ‘do
nothing’ option to a completely commercial model. The commercial model
would require fundamental changes — all territorial local authorities and Crown
assets would be transferred to one or more commercial enterprises owned jointly
by the Crown and the territorial local authorities. Charging mechanisms would
be replaced by time-, weight-, distance- and location-based charging. The present
model of cost recovery would be replaced by road pricing, with the implication
of a return on equity for new works. Financing of new roads would be ruled not
by annual budgets but by a capitalisation regime, with allowance for borrowing
to finance new roads. A regulatory regime would be introduced in order to
prevent monopoly behaviour, and other policies regarding externalities and
environmental problems would also be implemented. The intermediate proposals
concentrate more on improving the efficiency of the charging structure and do
not propose the final step of commercialisation.
Evidence from developing countries supports the view that setting up a Road
Fund without an adequate governance structure remedies few of the normal
problems of road finance. According to McCleary (1991), the World Bank, one
time enthusiastically in favour of earmarking for highway expenditure, has now
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changed its position. The Bank’s experience in the Central African Republic,
Colombia, Ghana, Mali and Zaire has not been very good. Ghana is the only
country where earmarking has had some success. In the other four countries,
earmarking has not succeeded. McCleary summarises the main problems
encountered:
•  Road funds are eroded during inflationary periods if the taxes are linked to
fuel prices and these are administratively set.
•  When the money is tight in the Treasury, earmarked funds may be
temporarily frozen (as in Ghana), diverted to other uses (as in Mali) or the
government and public firms may simply stop paying their fuel bills and
therefore, their fuel taxes (as in Zaire).
•  Even if road funds are sufficient there is no guarantee of efficient allocation
between maintenance, rehabilitation and new investment.
The experience in these developing countries suggests that the governance
and regulatory aspect is critical to the success of devolved road financing and
that establishing regulatory agencies competent to set charges and monitor road
expenditure and quality is at least as difficult, if not more so, than improving the
effectiveness of government (and its transport ministry). It does not necessarily
imply that developed countries that have evolved effective regulatory agencies
would encounter the same difficulties.
IX. EARMARKING UNDER BREAKING THE LOGJAM
In February 1999, the government published Breaking the Logjam, which
proposes primary legislation to allow local authorities to ‘have new powers to
enable them to charge drivers for using particular roads or roads in a specified
area, and to levy a charge on workplace parking’ (DETR, 1999, §2.8). The
legislation will provide ‘a requirement on traffic authorities to establish a free-
standing account in respect of income and expenditure associated with the
scheme; powers to enable operating costs (including enforcement) to be met
from revenue. Powers to require a proportion of the revenue to be paid to central
government’ (§3.2). The government clearly anticipates that ‘charging can be
expected to generate a sizeable revenue stream’ (§3.10) and proposes that ‘local
authorities which bring forward pilot road charging schemes should be able to
retain 100 per cent of the net revenue generated for at least 10 years’ (§3.13,
emphasis added). Presumably once the viability of road charging has been
demonstrated, the government will be able to decide what fraction should be
paid to central government.
These instruments are intended ‘for the purpose of reducing congestion or
traffic growth, or achieving other objectives contained in a local transport plan’
(§2.8). Road pricing, of which charging for parking can be seen as a part,Fiscal Studies
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appears the logical response to the rationing of underpriced and extremely scarce
urban road space. Although the theoretical case for road pricing is strong and
widely accepted, the proposals set out in the consultation document are deeply
flawed. The provision of urban road space is a natural monopoly, and most
systems of pricing natural monopolies are subject to regulation. Indeed, the
argument made above is that it was the combination of regulation, proper
accounting, periodic reviews and a dispute resolution procedure that was
decisive in allowing capital-intensive network utilities to be successfully
privatised. The present proposals make little mention of the need for regulation
of road prices or parking taxes, and appear to leave this in the hands of local
traffic authorities. There is also little discussion of the principles that should
guide the setting of such prices, as opposed to their design and geographical
extent (§4.3). Instead, local authorities are encouraged to set these levies to
finance transport or land-use plans as a claimed purely additional source of
revenue to block grants and conventional local property taxes. The only
recognition that some form of dispute resolution procedure might be needed lies
in §§4.20–23 where the suggestion is that it could all be handled by a Parking
Appeals Service.
The economic case for setting charges for accessing or parking in congested
areas is that the road users should pay the full social costs, including the
congestion costs, imposed on other road users. Although these may be difficult
to calculate, there are methods available that can give estimates before the
introduction of such schemes and which, combined with careful monitoring of
traffic levels and responses to charges, can be refined to improve estimates
during the trial periods. There are also established cost–benefit procedures for
determining the value of public transport investments or infrastructure
improvements, and there exist methods of assessing the land-use impacts of road
charges and other transport policies.
A proper system of regulation would compare the proposed prices against the
criteria of efficient allocation of road space (as measured by the current
congestion and other external costs). The same regulatory agency would also
scrutinise the social desirability of proposed uses of the revenue raised in new
investment projects. Without the assurance of an independent check on the
ability of the monopoly supplier of road space to extract revenue from his
captive clientele — road users — local businesses and shops will be most
mistrustful of the setting of such charges and will redouble their lobbying efforts
to suborn the political process and represent their views. This may be a recipe
for interest-group politics driving out the social good, and no doubt some towns
will be captured by green activists, anti-business groups and the like. Judging
from the past history of the business rate, eventually Whitehall will feel obliged
to set such taxes at national levels. It would be better to recognise the need to
protect minority business interests at the start, but to accept the need for
regulation rather than further central government taxation.Road Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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There are certainly good reasons for thinking that these proposals further
undermine the confidence that road users might have in the process of evolving a
satisfactory transport policy. There is no mention anywhere in the consultation
document of the current level of road taxes, which are, by a factor of four,
adequate to finance a considerable increase in investment in public transport and
transport infrastructure. Current road taxes exceed the current level of
environmental, social and congestion costs, as argued above. The current
government intends to continue to raise real fuel duties by 6 percentage points
above the rate of inflation annually, though emission levels are falling. Since
1992, emissions by the total population of cars have fallen by 37 per cent for
NOx (despite an increase of 10 per cent in numbers of cars), by 35 per cent for
the more damaging particulates, by 47 per cent for volatile organic compounds
and by 49 per cent for carcinogenic benzene (Automobile Association, 1998).
Surprisingly, emissions of CO2, which can only be reduced by reduced fuel
consumption, have not increased over this period. The new proposals add to this
escalating burden with a system of road pricing that loads additional charges
onto road users. The most effective way to generate massive opposition to the
new proposals is to suggest that they should be additional to, rather than a
replacement for part of, the existing level of road charges.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Earmarking taxes for dedicated expenditure on highways is an obvious
application of the benefit principle of taxation, which, properly applied, should
lead to a more efficient structure of road charges, perhaps one that eventually
matures into a full system of road pricing (responsive to levels of traffic and
hence congestion). The consequential price signals would play the normal
signalling and allocative function of prices in conventional markets, though the
network monopoly aspect of the service would require regulation and quality
monitoring if these signals are not to be distorted or ignored. The main
advantage at present is that earmarking should facilitate the proper design and
management of multi-year investment programmes without the inefficiencies
and/or inflexibilities imposed by an annual cash-limited budget and limited
precommitment of future revenues. The main potential benefit is that the road
user charges could evolve into a set of road prices without raising as much
opposition as would be the case were road pricing to be introduced as an
addition to current road taxes, as seems to be the danger with the government’s
current proposals.
The main problems have to do with the large capital element in the proper
calculation of average user charges and with the mismatch between the cost of
public sector borrowing and the required rate of return to earn on the
infrastructure. There are additional problems in setting the environmental and
other taxes to bring the total charge and tax on motorists up to their current levelFiscal Studies
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(on the politically reasonable assumption that a fiscally constrained government
will not willingly relinquish revenues that at present are not particularly
contentious). It may be that this can be tackled incrementally, defining the
combined tax and gradually clarifying the division between the environmental
taxes, which would be generally applied, and the balance, which would
eventually require some justification (other than environmental damage and road
costs).
The logical sequence of reforms would be to create OfRoad to monitor the
existing road system, to estimate the value of road capital and road user costs, to
agree an investment programme over the first five years and, with all this
information, to draw up a set of road user charges. In parallel, the Department of
the Environment, Transport and the Regions would devise the corporate
structure of Roadtrack, and the Treasury would design the remaining taxes for
road transport. When all the components are in place, the corporate structure can
then be implemented. One of the incidental, if cosmetic, benefits would be
change in the measured level of taxes, which would fall by the amount of road
user charges. The claim of this paper is that recent experience with regulating
capital-intensive network industries makes road user charging and the
commercialisation of the public highway both feasible and desirable.
APPENDIX. THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ROAD TRANSPORT
Table A.1 gives four different sets of estimates of the environmental costs of
road transport. Column 1 gives estimates taken from Maddison et al. (1996),
which revise the earlier figures given in Pearce et al. (1993). The figures for
global warming (i.e. CO2) are from Maddison et al. (1996) and are derived from
the shadow prices of controlling the last unit of CO2 released assuming optimal
abatement, where the marginal cost is $(1993)5.87 per tonne of carbon (tC), or
$0.63 per barrel of oil (bbl). This is only slightly less than the cost assuming
‘business as usual’, calculated as $6.07/tC, or $0.65/bbl. This is considerably
below the EU’s proposed carbon tax of $10/bbl, which, after negotiation within
the EU, was adjusted to 50 per cent on carbon and 50 per cent on energy.
Column 2 gives numbers from the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution (1994, Table 7.2), which clearly used Pearce et al.’s (1993) estimates
of the costs of air pollution but the EC’s proposed $10/bbl carbon tax, all on
carbon. Column 3 gives the figures where provided in Tinch’s (1995) report for
the Department of Transport. The report provides careful literature surveys for
air pollution and noise damage, though it computes the latter as the total cost of
traffic-related noise which exceeds 55dB(A) and takes each dB(A) as worth a
median value of £7.75 (±£2.25) per person per year. Tinch admits that this is an
average value for the total cost of traffic noise, not the marginal cost of
additional noise.Road Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmarking
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TABLE A.1




















Total air pollution 19.7
f 2.4–6.0 2.3 0.6–3.6
Global warming (CO2) 0.1 1.8–3.8 n.a. 0.1–1.8
Water pollution n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5–1.0
Noise 2.6–3.1 1.2–5.4 2.6 0.9–1.7
Total externality costs 13.3–35.3 5.4–15.2 n.a. 2.1–8.1
Costs per vehicle-km 2.9–7.7p 1.2–3.3p n.a. 0.5–1.8p
aMaddison et al., 1996.





Column 4 is Newbery’s (1997b) attempt to improve on the more obvious
shortcomings of these other estimates. Its main difference from earlier estimates
is that it corrects for the reduction in life expectation associated with pollution-
induced mortality, taking a median estimate of one year rather than the 35 years
used to value accident mortalities.
REFERENCES
Automobile Association (1998), Clearing the Air, Basingstoke: AA.
Bracewell-Milnes, B. (1991), ‘Earmarking in Britain: theory and practice’, in R. Teja and B.
Bracewell-Milnes, The Case for Earmarked Taxes, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Department of Transport (1995), The Allocation of Road Track Costs 1996/97, London: Statistics
Directorate, Department of Transport.
DETR (1998a), Transport Statistics Great Britain, 1998 edition, London: Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions.
— (1998b), A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone, Cm. 3950, London: The Stationery
Office.
— (1999), Breaking the Logjam, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions,
http://www.detr.gov.uk/logjam
Highways Agency and Department of Transport (1995), Roads DBFO Projects: Information and
Pre-Qualification Requirements, February.
HMSO (1993), Paying for Better Motorways, London: HMSO.
Institution of Civil Engineers (1996), Which Way Roads?, London: Institution of Civil Engineers.Fiscal Studies
132
— (1997), Paying for Transport: Improving Quality and Choice, London: Institution of Civil
Engineers.
Jeffreys, R. (1949), The King’s Highway, London: Batchworth.
Maddison, D., Pearce, D., Johansson, O., Calthrop, E., Litman, T. and Verhoef, E. (1996),
Blueprint 5: The True Costs of Road Transport, London: Earthscan.
McCleary, W. (1991), ‘The earmarking of government revenue: a review of some World Bank
experience’, World Bank Research Observer, vol. 6, pp. 81–104.
Newbery, D. M. (1988), ‘Road user charges in Britain’, Economic Journal, conference volume, pp.
161–76.
— (1989), ‘Cost recovery from optimally designed roads’, Economica, vol. 56, pp. 165–85.
— (1990), ‘Pricing and congestion: economic principles relevant to pricing roads’, Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 22–38.
— (1994), ‘The case for a public road authority’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, vol.
28, pp. 325–54.
— (1995), Reforming Road Taxation, Aldershot: Automobile Association.
— (1997a), ‘Determining the regulatory asset base for utility price regulation’, Utilities Policy, vol.
6, pp. 1–8.
— (1997b), ‘Charging transport users for environmental and social costs’, Cambridge University,
Department of Applied Economics, mimeo.
— and Pollitt, M. G. (1997), ‘The restructuring and privatisation of the CEGB: was it worth it?’,
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 45, pp. 269–303.
New Zealand Ministry of Transport (1997), Options for the Future: Land Transport Pricing Study,
Auckland: Ministry of Transport.
Ofwat (1998), Prospects for Prices: A Consultation Paper on Strategic Issues Affecting Future
Water Bills, Birmingham: Office of Water Services.
Pearce, D., Turner, R., O’Riordan, T., Adger, N., Atkinson, G., Brisson, I., Brown, K., Dubourg,
R., Frankhauser, S., Jordan, A., Maddison, D., Moran, D. and Powell, J. (1993), Blueprint 3:
Measuring Sustainable Development, London: Earthscan.
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1994), Transport and the Environment, 18th
Report, Cm 2674, London: HMSO.
Stationery Office (1998), New Ambitions for Britain: Financial Statement and Budget Report,
London: The Stationery Office.
— (1999), Building a Stronger Economic Future for Britain: Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report
and Financial Statement and Budget Report, London: The Stationery Office.
System of National Accounts 1993 (1993), Brussels/Luxemburg, New York, Paris and Washington,
DC: Commission of the European Communities, International Monetary Fund, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank (manufactured
in the US).
Tinch, R. (1995), The Valuation of Environmental Externalities, London: Department of Transport.